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The goal of this paper is to analyze the extent of international risk sharing in the presence of trade costs
and credit constraints, focusing on three issues : how the frictions play, how they interact and whether they
can be disentangled empirically. I build a simple model of a two-country endowment economy featuring
both shipping costs and non-enforceable ﬁnancial contracts. In a recursive contract framework, I show
how these two features jointly determine countries external imbalances. An important result is that the
credit constraints generated by the non-enforceability of contracts become looser as trade costs decrease.
This creates a multiplier for the impact of trade integration on risk-sharing. In the absence of aggregate
uncertainty, I ﬁnd that one could not tell whether risk-sharing is limited due to the segmentation of
goods markets or to limited debt capacity on ﬁnancial markets. This observational equivalence no longer
holds when aggregate uncertainty is allowed for, suggesting a way to disentangle the two sources of low
international risk-sharing.
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By the logic of the balance of payments, there would be no scope for international borrowing
and lending in a world with no tradable goods. Conversely, absent international capital ﬂows,
current accounts would always have to be balanced. These limit cases, though extreme, illustrate
a crucial point : trade ﬂows can be restricted due to constraints on international borrowing and
capital ﬂows can be hindered by frictions on international trade. In this paper, I draw on this
insight to analyze the causes of low international risk sharing, by which I refer to a set of well-
established stylized facts : low current account imbalances (Feldstein & Horioka [1980]), home
bias in portfolio (French & Poterba [1991]) and high intra-country correlation between output and
aggregate consumption (Backus, Kehoe & Kydland [1992]).
I build a simple model of a two-country endowment economy in which trade in goods and assets
can possibly be limited both on the real side by trade costs, and on the ﬁnancial side by borrowing
constraints. Within this framework, I analyze the determination of countries external imbalances
and tackle the following three questions : 1) is the presence of trade costs on goods markets
of ﬁrst order importance to account for the segmentation of international asset markets,o n c e
imperfections speciﬁc to capital markets have been taken into account? 2) how do each constraints
interact with each other? 3) is it possible to discriminate empirically which constraint is binding,
so that a precise cause could be assigned to low international risk sharing? These questions have
both a theoretical interest and far-reaching implications for policy recommendations on the issues
of economic and ﬁnancial integration.
This work is related to the vast amount of literature dealing with international portfolio diver-
siﬁcation, international borrowing and lending, and international risk sharing. In this literature,
a majority of papers typically invokes enforceability problems or asymetric information on in-
ternational ﬁnancial markets to match the puzzling stylized facts mentionned above1 .B u t i n
1 See the survey by Lewis [1999].
1a thought-provoking paper, Obstfeld & Rogoﬀ [2000] oﬀer a challenging view : they argue that
the so-called "puzzles" vanish once the existence of trade costs on international goods markets
is taken into account, with no need to invoke ﬁnancial market imperfections2 . My paper goes
beyond these alternative views by nesting them into a same theoretical framework. On the real
side, I follow Obstfeld & Rogoﬀ [2000] and model trade costs as iceberg costs, though my results
could be extended to an economy featuring the traditional "tradable vs. non-tradable goods"
dichotomy3 .O nt h eﬁnancial side, I have complete markets and full information but allow for the
possibility of default. Like most of the literature on international debt, I only consider "national
default risk", taking each country as a single entity that makes all lending, borrowing and default
decisions4 . I take the view that international contracts are not enforceable, which means that
in case of default creditors have no way to recoup anything from the defaulter, either by force or
by recourse to a third party. Hence in my model, international lending is not supported by any
collateral but "reputation". To make things tractable I assume that after a default, a country is
eternally plagued by bad reputation and loses access to capital markets forever — which is meant
to capture the fact that defaulter countries often experience an external credit crunch and face
higher interest rates. Endogenous borrowing constraints arise from this lack of enforceability and
from the lack of commitment to repay, in such a way that at equilibrium all contracts are self-
enforceable and default never happens5 . To incorporate this feature into the model, I extend the
literature on risk-sharing with imperfect commitment and endogenous borrowing constraints6 .
2 The "spill-over" mechanism from frictions on goods markets to asset market segmentation goes through
inﬂation and real interest rates: trade costs imply deviations from purchasing power parity and a link between
a country’s external position and its price level. For the empirical relevance of trade costs, see Anderson & van
Wincoop [2004].
3 For an analysis of the implications of trade costs on current account and real exchange rate, see Dumas (1992).
For their implication for portfolio choice, see Sercu, Uppal & Van Hulle (2000).
4 An analogous setting featuring "resident default risk" on private international debt contracts has been analyzed
in Jeske [2001] and Wright [2004]. The consequences of the separation of private borrowing decision and government
decision to repudiate or take other steps detrimental to foreign creditors is the topic of Tirole [2003].
5 This is made possible by the assumption of a complete menu of contingent assets. In an incomplete market
setting, Chatterjee, Corbae, Nakajima and Rios-Rull [2002] have developed a similar model in which defaults do
occur in equilibrium (in bad states of the world, which is a nice feature).
6 See Kocherlakota [1996], Ligon, Thomas & Worral [2002], Alvarez & Jermann [2000] and Kehoe & Perri [2002].
2Technically, my paper is part of a broad literature that uses "recursive contracts" to design
optimal insurance mechanism under various incentives problems7 . Within this literature, my
contribution consists in solving for constrained optimal allocations with both limited enforcement
and a proportional cost on transfers. Throughout the paper, I rely on "not too tight borrowing
constraints" àl aAlvarez & Jermann [2000] to implement this constrained optimal allocation in a
decentralized setting8 .
The model yields the following results. First, it clearly shows how imperfections on goods and
capital markets jointly determine the overall degree of international risk sharing. For a simple
version of the model, I can deﬁne four risk sharing regimes according to the role played by each
friction in the determination of countries external imbalances and I state conditions on a set of
key parameters for the economy to be in each regime. Second, I show that credit constraints
endogenously relax as trade costs decrease9 . The intuition for this impact of trade costs on credit
constraints is that the value of a "good reputation" is an increasing function of the gains from
trade. When a country loses access to capital markets, it also loses its ability to ﬁnance trade
deﬁcits and enjoy the gains from trade (in the one-good setting I adopt, there is only intertemporal
trade and the gains from trade amount to the gains from intertemporal consumption smoothing).
As trade costs diminish, more risk-sharing possibilities would be lost by returning to autarky.
Because the sanction in case of default becomes more painful, the threshold level of debt beyond
which a debtor would be tempted to default increases. Therefore, a decrease in trade costs causes
an increase in international ﬂows not only directly, as it costs less to ship, but also by increasing
the value of reputation, relaxing the borrowing constraints and allowing higher current account
imbalances. This extensive margin beyond the intensive margin creates a multiplier for the impact
7 Recursive contracts have been applied in various ﬁelds : growth (Marcet & Marimon (1992)), development
economics (Ligon, Thomas & Worral (2002)), labor economics (Hopenhayn & Nicolini (1997)), corporate ﬁnance
(Clementi & Hopenhayn (2002)), public economics (Attanasio & Rioss-Rull (2000), Golozov & Tsyvinski (2003)).
8 A formal treatment of the implementation issue is available upon request.
9 Lane (2001) gets this relationship more mechanically through ad hoc assumptions.
3of a decrease in trade costs on the extent of risk-sharing: I ﬁnd this ampliﬁcation mechanism to be
quantitively signiﬁcant. The third result bears on the empirical identiﬁability of the quantitative
impact of each friction. In the absence of aggregate uncertainty, I point at an observational
equivalence: without information on the underlying parameters of the economy, one could not tell
whether international risk sharing is due to the segmentation of goods markets or to imperfections
on ﬁnancial markets. When aggregate uncertainty is allowed for, this observational equivalence
no longer holds : ﬁnancial market imperfections induce history dependence (which materializes in
real exchange rate persistence) and the model suggests a way to identify the impact of trade costs
on risk-sharing.
The remaining of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the setup of the model
in a simple two-state case without aggregate uncertainty. This simple version of the model is
instrumental in illustrating the logic of the paper. I solve it in section 3 and comment the results
in section 4. In section 5, I extend the results to more general assumptions onc o u n t r i e s ’ e n d o w m e n t
processes, allowing for aggregate uncertainty. Section 6 concludes.
2 The model
I consider a pure exchange economy, with two countries i =1 ,2, each composed of a large number
of inﬁnite-lived identical agents. The countries are endowed in a same kind of non-storable good.
I refer to country i’s endowment by yi. To start with, I assume that the joint process for (y1,y 2)
takes a very simple form : there are two states of nature s =1 ,2 and p ∈ [0,1] denotes the
probability of remaining in the same state from one period to the next (alternatively, I write
πss0 = p if s = s0 and πss0 =1− p if s 6= s0). If s =1 , y1 = yH and y2 = yL,w i t hyL <y H.I f
s =2 , y1 = yL and y2 = yH. Hence, I assume no aggregate uncertainty and a perfect symmetry
in countries’endowments10 .
10 The markovian assumption makes the model irrelevant to study questions of development : the endowment
process is not altered by any kind of action. The logic is not to borrow to invest and foster growth. For the same
reason, introducing longer debt contracts would be redundant.
4The good can be exchanged on a competitive international market but subject to a trading
cost which takes the form of an "iceberg cost". I call τ ∈ [0,1] the percentage lost in shipping.
The presence of these costs allows deviations from purchasing power parity but by arbitrage these
deviations are bounded.
On the ﬁnancial side, I assume complete markets, with two contingent one-period securities
traded each period. I assume countries can default on their debt when this makes them better
oﬀ. In case of default, creditors have no way to recoup anything : contracts are not enforceable.
Trade in ﬁnancial assets is possible though because when a country defaults it is excluded from
asset markets forever11 . Ex post, a country takes the decision to default when the short-run gain
of doing so (increasing in the amount it has to repay) is higher than the long-run loss due to its
return to autarky. Hence, ex ante, creditors do not lend above a certain amount, above which
they know their debtor would default : the non-enforceability of contracts generates endogenous
credit contraints.











The parameter β denotes the time discount factor (0 <β<1), and ρ is the relative risk
aversion parameter.
11 Three remarks are in order here, having to do with realism, renegociation-proofness and the Bulow & Rogoﬀ’s
critique. Realism is not an issue : even if markets do not have a long memory, defaults are typically followed by
a temporary credit crunch and high interest rates — this is what this assumption captures and relaxing it to make
it more realistic would not alter the main points of our analysis. The other two issues are addressed by Kletzler
& Wright (2000). They show that our equilibrium allocation can be sustained by renegociation-proof strategies,
without resorting to the threat of autarky and they also show that with symmetric inability to commit and with
"cheat the cheater strategies" the Bulow & Rogoﬀ’s critique no longer holds.
53S o l u t i o n
3.1 Stationary constrained eﬃcient allocation
In this simple symmetric case with two states of nature and no aggregate uncertainty (like in
the example considered in Alvarez & Jermann [2001]), one can focus on a stationary constrained
eﬃcient allocation, as argued in the following proposition.
Proposition 1 : whatever the initial distribution of wealth, countries consumptions end up in
an ergodic set {cH,c L} and then are stationary, in the sense that they only depend on the current
state :
s =1 s =2
c1 cH cL
c2 cL cH









where the values VH, VL, Uaut
H and Uaut




VH = u(cH)+β [pVH +( 1− p)VL]





H = u(yH)+β [pUaut
H +( 1− p)Uaut
L ]
Uaut
L = u(yL)+β [pUaut
L +( 1− p)Uaut
H ]
6The inequality constraints are participation constraints. Their meaning is that at any time
and in any state, a country should be at least as well by cooperating with the other country as by
returning to autarky forever. Theses constraints are the exact counterpart in the planner problem
of borrowing constraints in the decentralized setting.
Further on, I will concentrate on the quantities shipped and consumed in the stationary allo-
cation. Before to start with the algebra, it should be clear that depending on the severity of each
friction, the economy can ﬁnd itself in one of the following four situations : 1) complete autarky
due to trade costs, 2) complete autarky due to participation constraints, 3) some integration lim-
ited by credit constraints, possibly interacting with trade costs if any, and 4) some integration
limited only by transportation costs (with the special case of full integration when τ =0 ).
3.2 Impact of trade costs
The impact of frictions on "real ﬂows" is the place to start with. Indeed, if trade costs are
prohibitive, countries will never import from abroad and credit constraints is not an issue.
Proposition 2 : Transfers occur only when the utility gain brought by smoothing outweighs
the iceberg cost of transfer. That is the case if (1 − τ)u0(yL) >u 0(yH).














These conditions are easily interpeted : for a certain size of country speciﬁc shocks (captured by
yL






7terms of decentralized equilibrium allocation, transfers only occur when the shadow real exchange
rate in autarky is above (1 − τ)
−1. For given trade costs τ,e n d o w m e n ts h o c k sh a v et ob el a r g e
enough (yH/yL > (1 − τ)−1/ρ) to bring deviations from purchasing power parity large enough to
compensate for trade costs. The size of the no-shipping region is decreasing in ρ, which captures
the willingness to smooth over time.
3.3 Impact of participation constraints
I am now considering the impact of participation constraints when trade costs are not prohibitive.
Is t a r tb yd e ﬁning the consumption allocation that would prevail absent participation constraints
(full-enforceability case). It is such that : (1 − τ)u0(c∗
L)=u0(c∗
H).
Proposition 3 : when participation constraints are not binding, the level of transfer T∗ (before
the losses due to "melting") from the country having a good shock to the other is given by :
yH − T∗





Now, the presence of participation constraints can have diﬀerent implications, according to
their severity, which is itself a function of some key parameters (concerning both preferences, like
β and ρ, and endowments, like p and yH/yL). Proposition 4 states conditions on the parameters
of the economy such that participation constraints never bind (the proofs for propositions 4 and
5 are in the appendix).
Proposition 4 : Deﬁne V ∗













H ,t h e n(c∗
H,c ∗
L) is the stationary equilibrium allocation.
8Condition V ∗
H >U aut
H is equivalent to a condition on τ being below a certain threshold.
When participation constraints do play, the remaining question is how much risk sharing
they allow, i.e. how far they push the economy away from (c∗
H,c ∗
L). Proposition 5 characterizes
the allocation resulting from the interplay between small trade costs and binding participation
constraints. In particular, it states conditions under which participation constraints prevent any
risk sharing among the two countries.












, countries remain in autarky







but τ is still too high
for condition V ∗
H >U aut
H to hold, the equilibrium allocation is implicitely deﬁned in the following
equation
u(cH)=






u[yL +( 1− τ)(yH − cH)].
The presence of costs on transfers does not alter the usual comparative statics results of the
literature on risk sharing without commitment: there is all the more risk sharing as β, ρ and
yH/yL increase and as p decreases.
4F i n d i n g s
The severity of the non-enforceability of contracts is not captured by one single parameter. The
appeal of Alvarez & Jermann’s "not too tight borrowing constraints" is precisely that they do
n o td e p e n do na ne x o g e n o u s l ya n da r b i t r a r i l yﬁxed parameter, supposed to capture the level of
imperfections on credit market, but on a whole set of fundamental parameters12 . To illustrate
the results of the model, I will use p, the probability of remaining in a same state from one period
12 A few papers in the literature on limited risk sharing show that models with endogenous borrowing limits
perform better than models with arbitrarily ﬁxed borrowing constraints. See for example Kehoe & Perri [2002].
9to the other, as a measure of the severity of the credit constraints brought about by contract
unenforceability. When p =1 , one country is constantly hit by luck and the other is constantly
unlucky. The rich never lends to the poor in such a world. When p =0 , countries alternate
deterministically from good to bad state : this is the most favorable scenario for risk sharing to
take place. In between, the higher p the more limited the extent of risk-sharing.
4.1 Risk sharing regimes
Figure 1 shows in the space (p,τ) the frontiers delineating the four possible regimes for our two-
country economy13 .F o r τ above 1 − (yL/yH)
ρ, trade costs are so high that they prohibit any
current account imbalance (I label this region "autarky due to transportation costs"). For τ below
this threshold, there are three more regions, depending on the tightness of borrowing constraints,
which itself depends both on p and τ.
For a given τ, as the persistence parameter p goes from 1 to 0, the economy typically goes
from no-risk sharing to a full risk-sharing regime, going through a zone of limited risk-sharing.
For τ =0 , the three segments correspond exactly to the three risk-sharing regimes in Alvarez &
Jermann [2001]. Compared to their paper, I add the vertical dimension.
For a given p, these zones correspond (in the same ordering) to a decreasing τ.F o r a g i v e n
level of endowment persistence, when trade costs decrease, credit constraints become looser — so
that the economy can reach a new regime more intensive in risk sharing. The mechanism is the
following : as trade costs decrease, transfers are easier to make, so that expected gains from trade
are higher — and hence the sanction incurred in case of default would be more painful. Lower
trade costs thus increase the incentive not too default and therefore relax the credit constraints.








. The other frontier has no closed-form expression : it corresponds to
13 The ﬁgures are drawn for the following calibration : yH =0 .6, yL =0 .4, β =0 .8 and ρ =3 .
10the V ∗
H = Uaut
H condition in proposition 4. The concave shape of the frontiers follows from the
interaction between credit constraints and trade costs : the lower p,t h el o w e rτ has to be to make
a certain level of risk-sharing sustainable.
The message delivered in ﬁgure 1 is that fostering trade integration (i.e. lowering τ)i sa
pre-requisite for ﬁnancial risk-sharing as it increases countries debt capacity14 .T h i sﬁgure also
enlightens the pains and beneﬁts associated with the process of globalization : as τ decreases,
the typical trajectory is to go from complete autarky due to trade costs to integration with risk
sharing — but in-between, there is an ungrateful regime to cross where the gains from integration
are not reaped because of imperfections on international ﬁnancial markets.
4.2 Accounting for low external imbalances
Figure 2b shows T(p,τ) the level of transfer (all at once net and gross) ﬂowing from the lucky
country to the unlucky. In the model, due to the absence of aggregate uncertainty and because of
stationarity, this level of transfer is constant in each period. The level of T for a given (p,τ) should
be compared with (yH + yL)/2,w h i c hi st h eﬁrst-best level of transfers, guaranteeing a constant
consumption level. The computed example is for yL =0 .4 and yH =0 .6,s ot h a tt h eﬁrst-best
situation would imply transfers of 0.1 from the lucky to the unlucky and constant consumption
equal to 0.5. By projection on the base of this three-dimensional picture, one easily recognizes
the shape of the regions exhibited in ﬁgure 1. Obviously, autarky due to trade costs looks exactly
like autarky due to credit constraints: T =0(more on this in section 4.5).
Figures 3 and 5 give a cross view of the surface. Figure 3 is drawn for τ =0: it exhibits the
pure impact of credit constraints (the tightness of which increases with p). Figure 5 shows the
impact of trade costs for a given persistence parameter p =0 .8. This is to compare with ﬁgure 4,
14 It should be clear that my model, at least in this totally symmetric speciﬁcation, is not relevant to understand
the North-South integration but rather the integration of similarly rich countries.
11which corresponds to the model with trade costs and perfectly enforceable contracts, then showing
the pure impact of trade costs.
What is the quantitative impact of the existence trade costs on the extent of risk-sharing?
To assess the impact of trade costs in a world featuring imperfections on credit markets, I start
by measuring the distance to the ﬁrst best level of transfers implied by enforcement frictions :
TFB − TBC. I then consider the level of transfer when both frictions are present and compute
TFB−TTC&BC. The percentage of the distance to the ﬁrst best that can be claimed to be due to





For yH =0 .6, yL =0 .4, β =0 .8 and ρ =3 , the calculations give that if τ = 20% the presence
of trade costs accounts for 50% o ft h ed i s t a n c et oﬁrst best, while trade costs of 10% would still
account for 33% o ft h ed i s t a n c et oﬁrst best.
4.3 Multiplier for the impact of trade integration
In the intermediate region deﬁned in proposition 5, the interaction between trade costs and credit
constraints ampliﬁes the overall impact of a decrease in trade costs on risk-sharing. This shows
up in the fact that under full contract enforceability a decrease in τ from 20 to 10% would cause a
5% increase in transfers, whereas when contracts are not enforceable (and for p =0 .8), the same
change in trade costs implies that the amount of transfers increases by 55.4%.
4.4 Welfare impact of frictions
It might be more telling to assess the impact of frictions in welfare terms. Figure 2a shows the
welfare impact of frictions. Based on this, I can use the standard measure "àl aLucas", computing
the permanent consumption decrease which would cause a welfare loss equivalent to that due to
the introduction of frictions. For τ =0 .2 and p =0 .8, the overall welfare loss corresponds to a
123.56% permanent consumption decrease. The presence of trade costs accounts for 35.5% of it. For
τ =0 .1, the corresponding ﬁgures are 2.06% and 28.7%.
4.5 Observational equivalence
Aq u e s t i o nd i ﬀerent from that of "risk-sharing accounting" is that of the "empirical identiﬁability"
of the causes of limited integration. The Obstfeld & Rogoﬀ [2000] paper immediately raises this
question : say we have no idea on τ, can we deduce from consumption, output and current account
data alone the importance of trade costs in limiting international risk-sharing? In my simple
model, the answer is no : any possible joint process for endowments and consumption allocations
can result from diﬀerent vectors of parameters, each exhibiting a diﬀerent level for τ. For instance,
for p =0 .8, ρ =3 , yH =0 .6 and yL =0 .4, there is a perfect observational equivalence between a
world with τ =0and β =0 .742 a n daw o r l dw i t hτ = 20% and β =0 .8 : high impatience or high
trade costs constitute alternative explanations for a given low level of risk-sharing. In section 5,
I show that this result must be qualiﬁed as soon as more general assumptions are made on the
endowment process.
4.6 Approximate portfolio bias
In the section of their paper dealing with the impact of trade costs on portfolio bias, Obstfeld &
Rogoﬀ [2000] adopt a model with a complete asset market. They easily compute the consumption
allocation, which due to their assumption of completeness is optimal. Then they argue that
though this allocation can not be supported as an equilibrium by trading only shares on countries
outputs15 , they can still approximate the composition of country portfolios that would give an
allocation close to the allocation they get assuming trading in a complete menu of assets.
I can do the same kind of exercise and possibly carry out the same kind of accounting than
15 For isoelastic utility, it is the case that, absent trade costs, the complete market allocation can be exactly
replicated by trading only output shares. This is because in this case, at optimum, each country’s consumption is
a constant share of global output. This no longer holds with trade costs.

















H =1 ,s u c ht h a t:
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cL = θ
dom
L yL + θ
foreign
L (1 − τ)yH






L )/2.T h ev a l u eo fθ
foreign for given parameters of the model would have to be compared
with the ﬁrst-best level of diversiﬁcation: θ
foreign = 50%.
5 Extension to S states and aggregate uncertainty
I now show how the simple model of the previous section extends to more general assumptions
on the joint endowment process. There are now S possible states of the world at each period,
the transition probabilities being given by πij = prob(st+1 = i|st = j).T h e Π(st+i |st) are the
conditional probabilities induced by the matrix [πij]. These assumptions nest iid and markov
distributions. They allow for aggregate uncertainty and for any correlation between endowments
(and for any relationship between idiosyncratic and aggregate risk). I will denote a history of
state realizations (s0,s 1,...,st) by st,w h e r est is the state realized in period t.
I now turn to the general planning problem that yields the constrained optimal allocation.
In what follows, I describe the transfers by two policy functions b(.) and l(.) : b denotes the
transferred quantity received by country 1, l denotes the quantity taken from 1 and transferred
























∀st,b (st),l(st) ≥ 0
Et(.) denotes the conditional expectation operator associated with probabilities Π(sτ |st), τ ≥
t. λ1 and λ2 are the initial Pareto-Negishi weights.
This problem consists in ﬁnding optimal history-contingent allocations that are both resource-
feasible and sustainable, in the sense that they respect participation constraints. These participa-
tion constraints capture the fact that at any time and for any given history, the parties involved
in the risk-sharing contract have the possibility to "default", i.e. to renege on the risk-sharing
contract and return to autarky.
In this general formulation, the problem is much more complex than the simple case I consid-
ered up to now. The trick to deal with this kind of problem consists in ﬁnding an appropriately
deﬁned state space in which the problem is stationary. I follow Marcet & Marimon [1994] and
take the modiﬁed relative weight as a state variable16 .
5.1 From history dependence to stationarity
In what follows, αi(st) denotes the Lagrange multipliers, normalized by Π(st |s0)β
t,f o rc o u n t r yi ’ s
participation constraint at time t after history st. Writing the Lagrangian and rearranging terms
using Abel’s partial summation formula (see appendix for details), the optimization problem can
be rewritten equivalently as the following saddle-point problem :
16 This method originated in papers by Kydland & Prescott [1980] and Hansen, Hepple and Roberds [1985]. For
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∀st,b (st),l(st) ≥ 0.
The ﬁrst-order condition with respect to consumption yields the following expression :
(1 − τ)
λ2 + α2(s0)+... + α2(st)







λ2 + α2(s0)+... + α2(st)
λ1 + α1(s0)+... + α1(st)
.
This expression captures all at once the logic of optimal allocations with transportation costs
and the logic of optimal risk sharing contracts with participation constraints. The former is easy
to understand : it is about sparing iceberg costs when transfers result in too little utility gain.
The latter is less obvious : it has to do with backloading as an incentive device. It implies that a
country’s "eﬀective" weight in the planner’s objective is not constant across dates and states : the
better its history of shocks, the higher the country’s relative weight. More precisely, a country’s
relative weight is increased when its participation constraint is binding (i.e. when αi(st) > 0).
This plays as an incentive mechanism : when a country is tempted to default, it is induced to
respect the contract by being credibly promised a higher continuation value17 .
17 The formulation in terms of "promised value" rather than in terms of modiﬁed weights follows from Abreu,
Pearce & Stacchetti [1990].
16Introducing z(st) the modiﬁed relative weight of country 2, one can rewrite more succintly :







This modiﬁed relative weight is a key variable : from the ﬁrst order conditions, it is immediate
that when z is added to the current state of nature as a state variable the problem is stationary.
5.2 Optimal policy functions
Solving for constrained-optimal allocations amounts to solving for policy functions l,b,C1,C 2,µ1,µ 2,Z,V 1,V 2
which satisfy the following system of equations for any x =( z,s) in [0,+∞] ×{ 1,...,S}:
—F O Cw i t hr e s p e c tt oc o n s u m p t i o n












— positivity and coherence of transfers
b(z,s),l(z,s) ≥ 0
b(z,s).l(z,s)=0


















17— participation constraints and complementary slackness conditions
µi(z,s) ≥ 0
Vi(z,s) − V aut
i (s) ≥ 0
µi(z,s).[Vi(z,s) − V aut
i (s)] = 0
The optimal policy functions can be found numerically. I use an algorithm iterating directly on
policy functions, starting from the optimal policy functions for the problem featuring trade costs
but full-enforceability18 . Once the optimal policy functions are obtained, getting results on aver-
age level of transfers or on macro correlations and volatility just involves computing unconditional
expectations by using the ergodic distribution induced by the markov chain.
5.3 Some insights
For given relative weight z (inherited from the past and fully summarizing it), the logic is exactly
the same as in section 3. If the state s is such that (1 − τ)z ≤
u0(y1(s))
u0(y2(s)) ≤ 1
1−τz (i.e. the ratio
of autarkic marginal utilities is within the band), there is no shipping. The question then is :
for "extreme" states, do participation constraints prevent the planner from implementing the
"optimal" allocation (i.e. optimal given τ)? Without loss of generality, I consider a situation in







Absent participation constraints (the constraint that could bind here is that of country 2), the







18 In the problem without trade costs, the starting point is also crucial for convergence of the algorithm (see
Kehoe & Perri [2002]). This is due to the fact that the underlying functional operator is not a contraction mapping.

















Overall, it is clear that, for a given history, depending on the state that realizes, the economy
ﬁnds itself in one of the four situations I identiﬁed as possible stationary outcomes in the simple
version of the model.
5.4 A 4-state example with aggregate uncertainty
To illustrate the properties of the model, I take S =4and I assume that country endowments in
each state are as follows :
s =1 s =2 s =3 s =4
y1 yH yH yL yL
y2 yH yL yH yL
The optimal policy and value functions all take z and s as arguments and also depend on the
whole range of parameters : β, ρ, p, yH, yL and τ. The baseline calibration is for β =0 .85, ρ =3 ,
yH =1 .694 and yL =0 .590. The matrix of transition probabilities follows from the individual
probability of remaining in the same state : p =0 .9.
Impact of trade costs on transfers and welfare — Figure 6 shows the transfer taking place in
state 1 as a function of z,f o rd i ﬀerent values of τ (net transfer from country 2 to country 1 before
19trade costs). In this state, both countries have a high endowment. There is a region around
z =1for which no transfer takes place. For z low enough, transfers go towards country 1. For
high z, transfers go to country 2. The impact of τ on transfers shows up both in the size of the
no-shipping region and in the size of transfers (see more details below).
To give an idea of the resulting impact of trade costs on welfare, I show in ﬁgure 7 how
constrained Pareto frontiers depart from ﬁrst-best frontiers. In each state, going from the upper-
right to the lower-left, the ﬁgure displays the ﬁrst-best welfare frontier, the frontier with capital
market imperfections and the constrained Pareto frontiers with both credit constraints and trade
costs of 20%. The welfare impact of trade costs beyond credit constraints is large.
Figure 8 shows the admissible values for z in each state for diﬀerent values of τ,f o rτ going
from 0 to 30%. In state 2 for instance, a state favorable to country 1, for given τ, there is a value of
z, ¯ z2 < 1, above which the expected value of country 1 is higher when defaulting and returning to
autarky than when transferring to the other country and keeping access to risk-sharing. Similarly,
one can deﬁne a lower bound z3 > 1 on the corresponding intervals for state 3. The intervals
[zs, ¯ zs] directly determine the policy function Z(z,s). In this particular example, it must be the
case (at least after a ﬁnite history of shocks) that Z(z,2) = ¯ z2 and Z(z,3) = z3.
Multiplier for the impact of trade integration — Figure 8 illustrates that ¯ z2(τ) is decreasing with
τ while z3 is increasing in τ. This is exactly what lies behind the interaction between trade costs
and credit constraints and the ampliﬁcation eﬀect that I emphasized in the preceding section. The
optimal transfer in state 2 for instance, T2,i sg i v e nb y
µ
yH − T2
yL +( 1− τ)T2
¶−ρ
=( 1− τ)¯ z2(τ)
By diﬀerentiating this expression, it can be easily shown that the term d¯ z2(τ)/dτ < 0 makes
|dT2/dτ| larger. This term captures the extensive margin in risk-sharing.
20Limited risk sharing and past dependence — Figures 9 to 11 illustrate the allocation resulting
from a given simulation for the markov chain (this is for τ = 20% and starting with z =1 ,t h e
sequence of shocks is listed at the bottom of ﬁgure 9). The ﬁrst ﬁgure clearly shows that for this
calibration choice, trade costs and credit contraints leave room for some but imperfect risk-sharing.
It also illustrates the role of past dependence : a country’s consumption does not only depend on
the current state but also on the preceding states.
Figure 10 shows the behavior of the Pareto-Negishi weight : switching to state 2 (resp. state
3) causes z to jump to ¯ z2 (resp. z3). Otherwise, the relative weight remains constant.
Eventually, ﬁgure 11 shows the behavior of the marginal utility ratio (circles). On this ﬁgure,
one can see that there are four possible values for u0(c1)/u0(c2).T h et w oe x t r e m ev a l u e s ,(1−τ)¯ z2
and z3/(1 − τ), each correspond to state 2 and 3, in which endowments are asymetric. The
marginal utility ratios in state 1 and 4 take intermediate values, ¯ z2/(1−τ) or (1−τ)z3, depending
on whether there was a state 2 or 3 in the close history of shocks. If τ was equal to zero, the band
around z would collapse.
5.5 Disentangling the frictions
The key diﬀerence between the general setting of this section and that of the rest of the paper has
to do with the role of the history of shocks. In the general case, "history matters" : it is a feature
speciﬁc to the "two-state and no aggregate uncertainty" model that the resulting allocation is
stationary19 .
When the question of "empirical identiﬁability" is revisited now, the message is modiﬁed. The
presence of imperfections on ﬁnancial markets induces a speciﬁc kind of "persistence" in countries
marginal utility ratio. The presence of trade costs induces no-shipping bands which aﬀect transfers
"at the margin" even when they do not prevent them. As a result, the behavior of the marginal
19 The stationarity of the 2-state problem without uncertainty is easy to understand now. It comes from the fact
that, in this degenerate case, the marginal utility ratio bounds between (1 − τ)¯ z1(τ) and z2(τ)/(1 − τ).
21utility ratio is substantially diﬀerent in the four cases of a) a model without frictions, b) a model
with trade costs only, c) a model with enforcement frictions only and d) a model with both capital
markets imperfections and trade costs. It is interesting to notice that when net transfers occur in
each period (as is the case in the example above), the process followed by the real exchange rate
corresponds exactly to the process followed by the marginal utility ratio u0(c1)/u0(c2). The model
therefore suggests that enforcement frictions could be a possible explanation for the observed
persistence in real exchange rates.
In the model, the ratio of marginal utilities (u0(c1)/u0(c2)) in state 3 divided by the ratio
of marginal utilities in a subsequent symmetric state directly gives (1 − τ)2 (while the marginal
utility ratio in state 2 divided by the ratio of marginal utilities in a subsequent symmetric state
gives 1/(1 − τ)2). Since the process followed by the marginal utility ratio u0(c1)/u0(c2) is related
to the real exchange rate process, this suggests a way to recover the size of τ from real exchange
rate data. Another strategy would consist in calibrating the parameters p, yH and yL to ap-
proximate output processes for a pair of countries via a markov chain (Tauchen’s method). Then,
for standard values of β and ρ,t h er a t i oo fsd(C)/sd(Y ) would only be a function of τ.O n c e
properly calibrated, the model could be used to evaluate the role of trade costs (beyond that of
capital market imperfections) in limiting international risk-sharing and to quantify their impact
on quantities, prices and welfare.
6C o n c l u s i o n
The goal of this paper was to analyze how frictions on international trade and on international
capital markets jointly determine countries external imbalances. I carried out this analysis for the
case of a symmetric two-country economy and sketched how each constraint plays and possibly
interacts with the other. The model exhibits a strong interaction between real and ﬁnancial
frictions, pointing at a form of complementarity between real integration (to be understood as a
22decrease in trade costs) and ﬁnancial integration, going through credit constraints. It yields a clear
message concerning globalization : trade integration has to come ﬁrst and it has to be fostered
beyond a certain level for countries to reap the welfare gains associated with more international
risk-sharing. Once this threshold is reached, the impact of a marginal decrease in trade costs is
strongly ampliﬁed via the credit market channel.
On an empirical ground, recent studies (see Rose [2002], Aviat & Coeurdacier [2004]) have
documented a robust positive relationship between trade in goods and bilateral capital ﬂows. My
model is instrumental in understanding this relationship as it captures the very essence of the
standard informal argument that debtors repay for fear of the loss in gains from trade following
default20 .
Possible extensions of the model could consist in considering more than one good21 .T h e
ﬁrst direction is to have non-tradable goods in each country. The second direction is to have two
diﬀerentiated (imperfect substitute) tradable goods, each good being produced in only one country.
In such a model, there would be "real" trade in goods (as opposed to intertemporal trade) and we
could possibly distinguish gross and net ﬂows. There would be at least two key diﬀerences : in the
default scenario, trade would still be possible after reverting to ﬁnancial autarky provided a trade
balance constraint is respected. Thus the autarky value would also increase when τ decreases.
Second, the terms of trade movements would create an alternative risk-sharing mechanism, as
emphasized by Cole and Obstfeld [1991]. I leave the analysis of the impact of the degree of goods
susbtitutability on the extent of risk-sharing for future research.
20 Some empirical evidence in favor of this argument can be found in Rose & Spiegel [2002], who show that past
default has long lasting negative impact on subsequent trade. Another informal argument emphasizes information:
trade creates a relationship and involves information ﬂows that reduce information asymetries. This channel is
certainly relevant too.
21 Bodenstein [2004] has a model analogous to mine with richer assumptions for commodity markets (borrowed
from Corsetti, Dedola and Leduc [2003]), though he has no shipping costs. His richer structure allows him to
address convincingly both the exchange rate volatility puzzle and the Backus-Smith puzzle.
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257A p p e n d i x
7.1 Proofs for section 3.3





. The problem is to characterize transfers in regime 3
and ﬁnd the frontiers delineating this zone (as shown in ﬁgure 1).
Under full-enforceability, the level of transfer T∗(τ) would be such that22
u0(yL +( 1− τ)T ∗)





For given T,d e ﬁne the values
VH = u(yH − T)+β [pVH +( 1− p)VL]
VL = u(yL +( 1− τ)T)+β [pVL +( 1− p)VH]










[(1 − γ)u(yH − T)+γu(yL +( 1− τ)T)]
• Lemma : VH(T) ≥ VH(0) ≡ V aut
H ⇒ VL(T) ≥ VL(0) ≡ V aut
L
The proof goes as follows.
VH(T) − V aut





VL(T) − V aut









γ , which ends the proof.
22 This is the level of transfer that prevails in regime 4. Under mild parameter condition, T∗ is decreasing in τ.
T h ep o s s i b l ea m b i g u i t yf o rt h es i g no ft h ed e r i v a t i v ec o m e sf r o mt h ed e ﬁnition of transfer as “pre-loss”. Looking
at the “post-loss” transfer would yield an unambiguous negative relationship.
26Then, for given parameter values, there are 2 possibilities:
—i fVH(T∗) ≥ VH(0) ≡ V aut
H , T∗(τ) is sustainable (regime 4),
— else risk-sharing is limited (regime 3) or completely impossible (regime 2) due to the
possibility of default.
• Level of transfer in regime 3
In regime 3, it must be the case that VH(T)=V aut
H .
Indeed, VH(T) <Vaut
H would not be sustainable and VH(T) >Vaut
H would be suboptimal : an
increase in transfers would decrease consumption volatility.
The problem then can be restated as
VL = u(yL +( 1− τ)T)+β
£




H = u(yH − T)+β
£
pV aut
H +( 1− p)VL
¤









u(yH − T)=( 1− βp)V aut
H − β(1 − p)VL (3)
Substituting (2) into (3), I get















u(yL +( 1− τ)T)
This equation implicitely deﬁnes T(τ) in regime 3.
27• F r o n t i e r2—3




H and α ≡
β(1−p)
1−βp .
The equation deﬁning T rewrites
u(yH − T)+αu(yL +( 1− τ)T)=Q
It is easy to check that this equation admits at least one solution : T =0 . The problem is to
ﬁnd a condition on τ such that this equation admits a positive solution.
O n en e e d st oc h e c kt h ed e r i v a t i v eo fu(yH − T)+αu(yL +( 1− τ)T) with respect to T at
T =0 . Indeed, the second derivative is negative. The strict concavity implies that a positive level
of transfer is feasible if and only if the ﬁrst derivative is strictly positive at T =0 .
the ﬁrst derivative is
−u0(yH − T)+( 1− τ)αu0(yL +( 1− τ)T)
the second derivative is
u00(yH − T)+( 1− τ)2αu00(yL +( 1− τ)T) < 0
the value of the ﬁrst derivative at T =0is
−u0(yH)+( 1− τ)αu0(yL)
Therefore, a positive transfer is feasible when
−u0(yH)+( 1− τ)αu0(yL) > 0
⇔ (1 − τ)
β(1−p)
1−βp u0(yL) >u 0(yH)











28• F r o n t i e r3—4
This is the locus where VH(T∗)=V aut
H . Equivalently, given the expression for VH(T),t h i si s
the locus where
β (1 − p)[u(yL +( 1− τ)T∗(τ)) − u(yL)] = (1 − βp)[u(yH) − u(yH − T∗(τ))]
This equation can not be solved for τ in closed-form. It must be solved numerically.
What can be said is that the condition VH(T∗(τ)) ≥ V aut
H amounts to τ b e i n gb e l o wac e r t a i n
threshold. Indeed, VH ◦ T∗ should be decreasing in τ.
The fact that region 4 is indeed below region 3 comes from the fact that for τ located on the
frontier 2 — 3, for any given positive transfer T, VH(T) <Vaut
H ,i np a r t i c u l a rVH(T∗(τ)) <Vaut
H .
• Variation of T with τ in regime 3
The equation deﬁning T rewrites





u0(yL) but τ is still too high for T∗(τ) to be sustainable. The problem
is to look at the impact of dτ < 0 on transfer.
Diﬀerentiating :





The numerator is positive. The sign of the derivative then is the sign of
α(1 − τ)u0(yL +( 1− τ)T) − u0(yH − T)
This is typically negative because of α(1 − τ).23
23 If we look at the "post loss" transfer, the condition becomes





αTu0(yL +( 1− τ)T)
α(1 − τ)u0(yL +( 1− τ)T) − u0(yH − T)




u0(yL +( 1− τ)T)+T(1 − τ)u00(yL +( 1− τ)T)
u00(yH − T)+( 1− τ)2u00(yL +( 1− τ)T)
Suppose parameters are such that
α(1 − τ)u0(yL +( 1− τ)T) <u 0(yH − T)
u0(yL +( 1− τ)T)+T(1 − τ)u00(yL +( 1− τ)T) > 0
so that both derivatives above are negative.
The mutiplier eﬀect shows up for given τ if
¯ ¯ ¯ ¯
dT
dτ
¯ ¯ ¯ ¯
regime3
>
¯ ¯ ¯ ¯
dT
dτ
¯ ¯ ¯ ¯
full−enforceability
i.e.
αTu0(yL +( 1− τ)T)
u0(yH − T) − α(1 − τ)u0(yL +( 1− τ)T)
> −
u0(yL +( 1− τ)T)+T(1 − τ)u00(yL +( 1− τ)T)
u00(yH − T)+( 1− τ)2u00(yL +( 1− τ)T)
αTu0(cL)




We know that τ is between two bounds, perhaps this can help show that the inequality holds.







1−τ u0(yH − 1
1−τ t)dt − t
(1−τ)2 u0(yH − 1









The sign of the derivative then is the sign of αu0(yL + t) − 1
1−τ u0(yH − 1
1−τ t).
This is typically negative too, but not unambiguously. Perhaps using the fact that τ is between two bounds
would lead to conclude that the derivative is always negative.
307.2 Appendix for section 5.1
By the Lagrange theorem, if {c∗
i(st)} is solution of the planning problem displayed at the start of
section 5, there is some {α∗
i(st)} such that {c∗
i(st),α ∗
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   
   
s.t. if c1(st) >y 1(st),c 1(st)=y1(st)+( 1− τ)[y2(st) − c2(st)]
| {z }
b(st)




In order to get the formulation of this saddle-point problem that I show in the text, just rewrite




































































31Fig. 1 : risk sharing regions
Fig. 2a : welfare
32Fig. 2b : transfers
Fig. 3 : pure impact of participation constraints
33Fig. 4 : pure impact of trade costs
Fig. 5 : impact of trade costs with participation constraints
34Fig. 6 : impact of trade costs on transfers
Fig. 7 : eﬀect of imperfections on Pareto frontiers
Fig. 8 : admissible values for z for τ from 0 to 30% (the states 1 to 4 read on the horizontal axis)
35Fig. 9 : simulated consumption
Fig. 10 : simulated Pareto-Negishi weight
Fig. 11 : simulated marginal utility ratio
36